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LET’S STOP PLAYING GAMES: A CONSISTENT 
TEST FOR UNLICENSED TRADEMARK USE AND 
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN VIDEO GAMES 
ARLEN PAPAZIAN* 
ABSTRACT 
Courts cannot agree on how to handle cases centered on unli-
censed use of a trademark or celebrity’s likeness in video games. 
Two tests have arisen as the primary standards by which to judge 
such cases: the Rogers test and the transformative-use test. How-
ever, in an area of law muddled by multiple standards and the 
inconsistent application of those standards to a relatively new me-
dium, neither test can adequately balance mark holder rights with 
the constitutional rights of video game developers. In this turmoil, 
large video game companies take advantage of marks and licenses 
knowing the rightful holders will have little recourse, while other 
mark holders bring frivolous suits against earnest game developers 
who simply want to create a work of immersive art. In order to tame 
this unrest, courts must adopt a single standard that can be applied 
consistently to all cases. Many scholars tout the transformative-
use test as this standard, but it is not adequate. 
This Note proposes a modification of the Rogers test that con-
siders the factors of sufficient transformation, affirmative state-
ments of sponsorship by the developer, the purpose of the mark use, 
and its frequency and importance in the context of the video game. 
This test will allow courts to comprehensively balance all parties’ 
rights while still upholding precedential case law. 
                                                                                                                         
* Author is a J.D. Candidate at William & Mary Law School. He wishes to 
thank his family for always encouraging and supporting him, in particular his 
sister, Sabrina Papazian, for being a brilliant and driven role model, as well as 
the staff of The William & Mary Business Law Review for all their work in 
editing this Note.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Ryan Hart stands poised, ready for the snap. He dons his jersey, 
number thirteen with “RUTGERS” emblazoned proudly above it in 
large block letters. This is his home field; these are his fans that 
cheer enthusiastically in the crowd. The din diminishes as they 
wait for the game announcer to finish the sponsored advertise-
ment. The image on the jumbotron shifts back to the field as the 
large Pontiac logo disappears off the screen. His team makes some 
last second adjustments to prepare themselves for the play. He 
locks his eyes on the football and takes a step back. These are the 
moments Ryan Hart plays football for. These are the moments 
Ryan Hart lives for. Except, this is not Ryan Hart. It is a virtual 
avatar of Ryan Hart. This is not Rutgers’s field; we are in EA 
Sports’s video game NCAA Football 2005. And, this is not what 
Ryan Hart signed up for. 
TV shows and movies frequently use celebrity likenesses as 
well as real-world products and brand names in order to create a 
more recognizable and immersive experience to which viewers 
can relate.1 Video games may be a more recent form of art and 
entertainment, but they too often use real-world likenesses to de-
liver a captivating experience.2 However, video game developers 
are not always consistent in whether they gain permission from 
celebrities or trademark holders whose likenesses they use.3 
                                                                                                                         
1 See Wesley W. Wintermyer, Who Framed Rogers v. Grimaldi?: What Pro-
tects Trademark Holders Against First Amendment Immunity for Video Games?, 
64 ALA. L. REV. 1243, 1243 (2013). 
2 Even some of the earliest video games used celebrity likenesses to help 
sales. See Peter Mai, Plagiarism?: Video Game Art That Looks Like the Movies, 
OC WEEKLY (June 2, 2010, 10:46 AM), http://blogs.ocweekly.com/heardmental 
ity/2010/06/plagiarism_video_game_art_that_copied_movie_posters.php [https:// 
perma.cc/VPZ6-ZHN8] (describing resemblances between many video game char-
acters and contemporary movie stars through the decades). 
3 Compare Chris Suellentrop, Casting the Single-Player Movie Star: Kevin 
Spacey Stars in Call of Duty: Advanced Warfare, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2014), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/02/arts/video-games/kevin-spacey-stars-in-call-of-duty 
-advanced-warfare.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/L32V-BZZP], with Sam Byford, 
Ellen Page Accuses ‘The Last of Us’ Developers of ‘Ripping Off’ Her Likeness, 
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Sometimes the developer will not bother to ask for permission at 
all.4 Other times, developers may hire an actor to undergo motion-
capture filming and rendering to deliver as lifelike a performance 
as possible.5 The inconsistent practices of developers stem from the 
relative novelty of the video game industry and the varying tests that 
courts apply to settle cases of unlicensed image use in this field.6 
The inconsistent practices of developers do not end with celeb-
rity likenesses. In order to fully assimilate players into the uni-
verse created by the video game, different games can include all 
manner of consumer products and brand names based on real-
world counterparts: cars, clothes, weapons, and more.7 These 
products and brands are frequently trademarked, but developers 
do not bother seeking approval from the trademark holder to use 
their intellectual property.8 
Trademark law exists to prevent consumer confusion and pro-
tect ownership rights.9 A right of publicity is also widely recognized 
by many states,10 often as an extension of the right of privacy.11 
The right of publicity exists to protect an individual’s ability to 
control the image and reputation that he has built for himself.12 
These rights can sometimes come at odds with the First Amend-
ment right of freedom of expression of another party who desires 
to use his image.13 Freedom of expression protects the use of a 
                                                                                                                         
4 Byford, supra note 3. 
5 Suellentrop, supra note 3. 
6 Compare E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 
1099 (9th Cir. 2008) (utilizing a standard called the Rogers test), with Hart v. 
Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 160 (3d Cir. 2013), and In re NCAA Student-
Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig, 724 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(applying the transformative-use test). 
7 Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1243.  
8 Id. at 1243–44. 
9 James E. Stewart & Amy A. Lehman, The First Amendment and the Lanham 
Act: What is This Thing Called Artistic Relevance?, 28 COMM. LAW. 4, 4 (2012); 
see also Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2012). 
10 See generally Right of Publicity: An Overview, CORNELL UNIV. L. SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/Publicity [http://perma.cc/9LF8-U6J8]. 
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–652I (recognizing intru-
sion, false light, appropriation of name or likeness, and unreasonable publicity 
as the four types of invasion of privacy). 
12 Joseph Gutmann, Note, It’s in the Game: Redefining the Transformative 
Use Test for the Video Game Arena, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 217 (2012). 
13 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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name, likeness, or trademark except when used in a commercial 
manner.14 Courts should establish a consistent test with which to 
best balance these competing rights. 
Part of the trouble with determining consistent outcomes for 
cases revolving around video games arises from the gray area that 
they occupy as both an artistic work and a commercial product. Use 
of a likeness, name, or trademark without license for purely artistic 
expression is protected.15 On the other hand, the Lanham Act pro-
hibits unlicensed use of that same likeness, name, or trademark 
for a primarily commercial purpose.16 Video games are undoubt-
edly both, so how should courts decide how to categorize decisions? 
Different courts have primarily used two different tests to 
judge cases of this kind: the Rogers test and the transformative-
use test.17 Cases involving the right to publicity tend to invoke 
the transformative-use test,18 while cases involving claims of 
trademark usually stand scrutiny against the Rogers test.19 This 
Note discusses which test would be most effective in determining 
both categories of claims. Part I lays out the background cases from 
which the primary tests were derived.20 Part II examines the treat-
ment of right of publicity issues in video game cases.21 Part III 
delves into some of the counterpart cases centered on trademark 
use in video games.22 Part IV argues that video games are primar-
ily a consumer product and that the Lanham Act should govern 
both right of publicity cases and trademark cases, and both should 
be subject to the same test.23 Finally, Part V proposes use of a 
                                                                                                                         
14 Id.; see also Gutmann, supra note 12, at 218. 
15 “[B]ecause of First Amendment concerns, the Lanham Act cannot apply... 
‘within the realm of artistic expression[.]’” Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 
997 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988)). See generally Steward & Lehman, supra note 9. 
16 Right of Publicity: An Overview, supra note 10; see also Trademark (Lanham) 
Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2012). 
17 See generally Rogers, 875 F.2d 994 (establishing Rogers test); see also 
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001) 
(establishing the transformative-use test); Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1244. 
18 See infra Part II. 
19 See infra Part III. 
20 See infra Part I. 
21 See infra Part II. 
22 See infra Part III. 
23 See infra Part IV. 
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modified Rogers test that incorporates the transformative-use 
test as a factor.24 This test considers other factors as well—namely 
presence of an affirmative statement of sponsorship, purpose of 
the mark use, and frequency and importance of the use—to ensure 
even-handed protection of mark holders as well as the artistic ex-
pression of video game developers. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A “likelihood of confusion” analysis stands as the traditional 
test used in trademark infringement cases.25 While courts may 
consider varying factors in this analysis, the core determinations 
are outlined in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.26 These 
variables include: the strength of the prior owner’s mark, the de-
gree of similarity between the marks, the commercial proximity 
of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the 
gap by entering and competing in the subsequent owner’s market, 
the risk of actual consumer confusion, the intent of the defendant 
to capitalize on the reputation of the prior owner, the quality of 
the defendant’s product, and the sophistication of consumers.27 
This long list of factors has been a source of confusion in many 
trademark cases,28 but it is particularly ill-suited regarding cases 
involving video game disputes. 
Video games did not find widespread mainstream popularity 
and commercial success until the 1970s,29 about a decade after 
Polaroid was decided. Polaroid could not have contemplated vir-
tual trademark use, as it was not a technological possibility at the 
time. Furthermore, trademarks used in video games are usually 
merely incidental in the context of the game.30 Ideally, only in rare 
                                                                                                                         
24 See infra Part V. 
25 See Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1244.  
26 See generally Kevin Blum et al., Consistency of Confusion? A Fifteen-Year 
Revisiting of Barton Beebe’s Empirical Analysis of Multifactor Tests for Trade-
mark Infringement, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 3 (2010). 
27 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). 
28 Blum et al., supra note 26, at 3. 
29 Riad Chikhani, The History of Gaming: An Evolving Community, 
TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 31, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/31/the-history-of 
-gaming-an-evolving-community/ [http://perma.cc/U3NB-SU7Q].  
30 “[U]se of the mark is only incidental to the game itself and not integral to 
its sale or marketing, the likelihood is slim that the average gamer would be 
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cases should a consumer face actual confusion about a mark holder’s 
role in developing a game.31 On the other hand, the increase of 
product placement in video games, and all media generally, may 
lead consumers to believe that the appearance of a familiar trade-
mark or likeness is the result of cross-promotion.32 
Instead of trying to stretch the “likelihood of confusion” test 
developed by the Polaroid court for trademark disputes in pure 
commercial settings, courts have sought to resolve trademark dis-
putes in video games by applying tests used in comparable cases 
involving similar media—namely television and movies.33 In Rogers 
v. Grimaldi, Ginger Rogers—a famous actress—brought action 
against defendant filmmakers for invoking her name and reputa-
tion in the movie “Ginger and Fred.”34 Rogers brought claims un-
der the common law right to publicity and under the Lanham 
Act.35 Rogers carefully selected her chosen endorsements and 
feared her reference by the film would cause consumers to believe 
she endorsed the work.36 That court found in favor of the filmmak-
ers, holding that the use of a mark or celebrity’s name in the title 
of a work is permitted so long as the title has some artistic rele-
vance to the underlying work and is not meant to explicitly mis-
lead as to the source or content of the work.37 This test presumes 
that every use of a mark is protected by the First Amendment 
freedom of artistic expression.38 Because of the low standard for 
                                                                                                                         
confused that the markholder actually developed the game.” Wintermyer, supra 
note 1, at 1244 (citing Russell Frackman & Joel Leviton, Trademarks, Video 
Games and the First Amendment: An Evolving Story, WORLD TRADEMARK REV., 
Oct./Nov. 2010, at 62, 63). 
31 Id. 
32 See infra notes 113–21. 
33 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 496 (2d Cir. 1961).  
34 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1989).  
35 Id. The Lanham Act protects against 
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or ser-
vices, ... uses in commerce any ... name ... which ... is likely to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the af-
filiation, connection, or association of such person with another 
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her 
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person .... 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012). 
36 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
37 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
38 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1257. 
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artistic relevance, the Rogers test is extremely lenient towards 
the user of a mark or name.39 
The transformative-use test has emerged as another standard 
by which courts analyze use of a name, mark, or image in artistic 
media. This test, instead of determining the value of artistic rele-
vance, focuses on whether the use varies from the protected mark 
in a substantial creative way.40 The California Supreme Court pi-
oneered the transformative-use test in Comedy III Productions, 
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.41 In that case, Comedy III Productions 
owned the rights to the former comedy act The Three Stooges.42 
Comedy III Productions sued Saderup, an artist selling litho-
graphs and t-shirts bearing the likenesses of the Three Stooges, 
Moe, Larry, and Curly, for infringement of its right of publicity.43 
That court asked if the contested work added significant creative 
elements so as to transform it into something more than a mere 
imitation or celebrity likeness.44 The First Amendment protects 
works that have been sufficiently transformed in this way, but 
does not protect depictions that are mere replications.45 The 
court, in its holding, recognized the right of publicity as an intel-
lectual property right.46 Recently, in 2013, both the Third and 
Ninth Circuits accepted the transformative-use test as the appro-
priate standard in right of publicity cases regarding reproduction 
of celebrity likenesses.47 
The transformative-use test does not provide as much leniency 
to unlicensed trademark users as the Rogers test does. While Rogers 
                                                                                                                         
39 The Rogers test is designed to protect consumers from flagrant deception, 
not intellectual property right holders. Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1252. The 
Rogers court defined the standard for artistic relevance that the mark or name 
must meet as the extremely low threshold of “minimal” artistic relevance. Id. 
at 1257. 
40 See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 800. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 799, 809 (stating that the First Amendment will not protect the 
depiction if it is “the very sum and substance of the work in question.”).  
45 See Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1257. 
46 Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 806. 
47 See generally Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); In re 
NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
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provides the defendant the wide berth of a low threshold for ar-
tistic relevance, the transformative-use test places the burden of 
proof on the content producer to prove that the trademark use 
presents enough creative difference to warrant protection under 
the First Amendment.48 However, the transformative-use test 
has led to varying results by different courts because of the vague-
ness of what constitutes “significant creative elements.”49 
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND THE TRANSFORMATIVE-USE 
TEST IN VIDEO GAMES 
The first case to apply the transformative-use test to a video game 
was another California case, Kirby v. Sega of America.50 Kierin 
Kirby, lead singer for Deee-Lite, a funk-dance band in the early 
1990s, brought suit against Sega of America for allegedly using 
her likeness as the basis for the protagonist character in the game 
Space Channel 5.51 Kirby claimed the character resembled her fa-
cial features, futuristic clothing style, hairstyle, use of catch phrases, 
and musical and dance abilities.52 Applying the transformative-
use test, that court determined that Sega had transformed the 
virtual character into more than a mere likeness or exact depic-
tion of Kirby.53 This was primarily because the character wore 
different costumes and used different dance moves than Kirby; 
additionally, the character was a futuristic news reporter by pro-
fession, dissimilar to Kirby’s public image as a music diva.54 
More recently, many cases centering on virtual representa-
tions of college athletes, primarily football players, in sports video 
                                                                                                                         
48 Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1258. 
49 District courts in California and New Jersey have applied the transformative-
use test to very similar fact patterns and came to different results based on 
their interpretations of the definition of “sum and substance.” Gutmann, supra 
note 12, at 225. 
50 Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
51 Id. at 50–52. 
52 Id. at 56. For a comparison image of Ms. Kirby and Space Channel 5 pro-
tagonist, “Ulala,” see The Right of Publicity—Concerns About the Reach of Keller 
v. EA, WRITER IN L. (Aug. 16, 2013, 6:31 PM), https://writerinlaw.files.word 
press.com/2013/08/kirby.jpg [https://perma.cc/M9WB-E6H9]. 
53 Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 59. 
54 Id. “Taken together, these differences demonstrate Ulala is ‘transforma-
tive,’ and respondents added creative elements to create a new expression.” Id. 
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games have addressed the right of publicity and the transformative-
use test.55 These cases applied the same test to very similar facts, 
but—because of the vagueness of the transformative-use test—came 
to different conclusions at the district court level.56 The District 
Court for the Northern District of California held in Keller v. Elec-
tronic Arts that a virtual representation of college football player 
Sam Keller in the video game series NCAA Football did not con-
stitute a transformative use and was therefore barred from First 
Amendment protection.57 That court looked at the built-in char-
acteristics of the avatar to determine if any significant elements 
had been added. It did not consider the ability for players to cus-
tomize and interact with the avatars.58 
A District of New Jersey court looked at different factors in 
determining what might suffice as creative elements for trans-
formative use, originally holding in Hart v. Electronic Arts that 
the avatar of Ryan Hart in the same NCAA Football video game 
franchise on its own would constitute an untransformed image; 
however, a player’s ability to customize the features of the avatar 
made for a transformative use.59 When deciding what establishes 
the significant creative elements for transformative-use, that 
court not only considered the physical depiction of the avatar and 
the game’s environment, but also the level of changeability and 
interactivity available to game players.60 
Despite confusion at the district court level, circuit courts have 
been more consistent with their rulings on transformative-use 
                                                                                                                         
55 See generally Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); In re 
NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th 
Cir. 2013); Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1130, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 8, 2010); O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 
955 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). 
56 Gutmann, supra note 12, at 225. 
57 Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at *5. 
58 Gutmann, supra note 12, at 217. The Court only looked at similarity of 
physical characteristics between Keller and his avatar: height, weight, jersey 
number, and public image as a football player. Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at *5. 
59 The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey stated that since 
interactivity is an essential nature of video games, the ability for consumers to 
edit the features of the virtual players and the “potential formulations of each 
virtual player alone makes the game a transformative use of Hart’s image.” 
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 785 (D.N.J. 2011), rev’d, 717 F.3d 
141 (3d Cir. 2013). 
60 Gutmann, supra note 12, at 224–25. 
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cases in video games.61 In In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litigation v. Electronic Arts (“In re NCAA”), 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s de-
cision that the use of Keller’s image in the NCAA Football series 
did not constitute a transformative use.62 The Third Circuit, on 
the other hand, reversed the district court of New Jersey’s decision 
in Hart.63 The Third Circuit still applied the transformative-use 
test, but it did not find that the ability to customize and modify the 
avatars to satisfied the significant creative element requirement.64 
Since the original unmodified avatar was an untransformed use, 
the First Amendment did not protect it.65 These decisions begin to 
harmonize the standard and interpretation of the transformative-
use test. The earlier district court decisions demonstrate, however, 
that there still exists variation in how the test may be applied. 
When looking at the difference between the outcomes of the Kirby 
case and the NCAA Football cases, it appears that the environ-
ment and persona of the virtual depictions stand as critical issues 
in determining whether a significant transformation occurred.66 
III. USE OF UNLICENSED TRADEMARKS AND THE ROGERS 
TEST IN VIDEO GAMES 
Courts have readily applied the Rogers test to many cases in-
volving unlicensed use of a trademark in video games.67 Although 
                                                                                                                         
61 See generally Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 141 (3d Cir. 2013); In 
re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
62 NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d at 1276. 
This case is a continuation of Keller as a larger class-action suit. See id. 
63 Hart, 717 F.3d at 141. 
64 Id. at 166, 174–75. 
65 Id. at 170. 
66 Gutmann, supra note 12, at 225. An important factor in deciding if there 
has been a transformative use should be whether or not the game takes place 
in an “altered reality” or is an “imitation of life.” Id. at 227. An environment 
that solely seeks to imitate life through realism is not an original creation. Id. at 
229. However, when a developer places a celebrity’s likeness in a new environ-
ment or gives it a new persona or new characteristics, the game alters signifi-
cant aspects of reality and gives rise to a new creation that should be protected 
by the First Amendment. Id. at 228–29. 
67 See generally E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 v. Rock Star Videos, 547 F.3d 1095 (9th 
Cir. 2008); VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entm’t America LLC, No. 3:15-cv-
01729-LB, 2015 WL 5000102 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015); Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. 
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the Rogers test traditionally applies to the title of an artistic work, 
it may also be extended to a trademark use in the body of the 
work—in these cases, trademark use within actual video games.68 
In E.S.S. Entertainment 2000 v. Rock Star Videos, the owner of a 
strip club, Play Pen Gentlemen’s Club, brought suit against Rock-
star, the developer of the Grand Theft Auto video game series.69 
The game Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas takes place in a fictional 
recreation of California State and even contains a cartoon-style rep-
lication of Los Angeles entitled “Los Santos.”70 In order to appro-
priately capture the feeling of the seedy underbelly of Los Angeles, 
Los Santos contained a virtual strip club called the “Pig Pen.”71 
The owner of the real-life strip club, the Play Pen, claimed that 
the virtual gentleman’s club constituted trademark infringement 
on the business from which it drew its inspiration.72 The Ninth Cir-
cuit applied the Rogers test to determine that the “Pig Pen” served 
at least “some artistic relevance” in setting the tone of the game,73 
and Rockstar did not attempt to “explicitly mislead … as to the 
source or content of the work.”74 This holding shows the excep-
tional leniency of the “artistic relevance” prong of the test.75 The 
video game is not about a strip club, nor is the strip club necessary 
to the story; it simply exists as a set piece to establish the “look 
and feel” of the environment.76 Under this standard, it is hard to 
imagine an example that would not satisfy the relevance prong of 
the Rogers test. 
                                                                                                                         
v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Novalogic, 
Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 885 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Dillinger, 
LLC v. Elec. Arts, No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 WL 2457678 (S.D. Ind. 
June 16, 2011). 
68 E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, 547 F.3d at 1099. 
69 Id. at 1097–98. 
70 GRAND THEFT AUTO: SAN ANDREAS (Rockstar Games, PlayStation 2 2004); 
E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, 547 F.3d at 1097. 
71 E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, 547 F.3d at 1097. 
72 Id. at 1097–98. 
73 Id. at 1100 (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
74 Id. A reasonable buyer would not conclude that a small, largely unknown 
strip club helped produce a technically complicated game that painted the club 
in an unfavorable light; nor would a buyer reasonably believe that a game de-
veloper operated a strip club. Id. at 1100–01. 
75 Id. at 1099. 
76 Id. at 1100. 
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Since E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, courts in the Ninth Circuit 
have repeatedly and liberally applied the Rogers test to video game 
cases.77 One district court in the Seventh Circuit also has applied 
the same standard.78 That case centered on the use of the “Dillinger” 
trademark name—referencing famous American gangster John 
Dillinger—in naming weapons in Electronic Arts’s The Godfather 
games.79 The plaintiff argued that the use of Dillinger’s name was not 
a reasonably necessary aspect of the games because John Dillinger 
did not appear in the video games nor the films or novel on which 
Electronic Arts based the games.80 The court rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument because Dillinger’s name, even though only superficial 
and attenuated, had at least some artistic relevance in establish-
ing the Mafia world of The Godfather games.81 
Since the “artistic relevance” prong of the Rogers test sweep-
ingly permits trademark use in the name of the First Amendment, 
it is hoped that the second prong—the “explicitly misleading” 
prong—might help to balance trademark holders’ interests against 
developers’ constitutional rights. In a suit against Textron Inno-
vations, Electronic Arts—once again the perpetrator of unlicensed 
trademark use—preemptively brought action to justify use of a vir-
tual representation of a Bell Helicopter in the video game Battle-
field 3 under the Rogers test.82 The district court denied Electronic 
                                                                                                                         
77 See generally VIRAG, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entm’t America LLC, No. 
3:15-cv-01729-LB, 2015 WL 5000102 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015) (dismissing plain-
tiff’s complaint of infringement for use of VIRAG’s trademark in defendant’s 
games Gran Turismo 5 and Gran Turismo 6); Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activi-
sion Blizzard, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (granting summary 
judgment to defendants for use of registered “angry monkey” mark on military 
combat gear in Call of Duty: Ghosts); Novalogic, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 
41 F. Supp. 3d 885 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (granting summary judgment to defendants 
regarding use of word mark “Delta Force” in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3). 
78 See generally Dillinger, LLC v. Electronic Arts, No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-
DKL, 2011 WL 2457678 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011). 
79 Electronic Arts chose to name two Tommy Guns after Dillinger because 
he was popularly depicted wielding the submachine guns as his weapon of choice. 
Id. at *2. 
80 Id. at *4. Plaintiff further argued that John Dillinger was not even alive 
during the time period in which the games take place and operated in a differ-
ent location from the games’ setting. Id. 
81 Id. at *5. 
82 See generally Electronic Arts, Inc. v. Textron Inc., No. C 12-00118 WHA, 
2012 WL 3042668 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012). 
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Arts’s motion to dismiss Textron’s counterclaims.83 Textron’s alle-
gations raised sufficient support for an inference that Battlefield 
3 and its advertising were explicitly misleading as to its source 
and content.84 Textron claimed that the ability to virtually fly Bell 
Helicopters in the game would factor into a consumer’s decision to 
buy Battlefield 3.85 The video game’s website additionally adver-
tised one of the helicopters specifically in a promotional image en-
couraging consumers to buy the game.86 Despite Textron’s strong 
argument to trigger the explicitly misleading prong of the Rogers 
test, Electronic Arts settled the suit out of court before a final verdict 
could be entered. Although details of the settlement are unknown, 
perhaps Electronic Arts was eager to settle in order to prevent the 
risk of that court holding that the use of Textron’s trademark and 
trade dress triggered the explicitly misleading prong. A ruling 
against Electronic Arts would have created troublesome precedent 
for them that could have checked the developer’s so-far-unbridled 
use of unlicensed trademarks and likenesses. 
The Rogers requirement that unlicensed mark users avoid ex-
plicitly misleading consumers may provide more hope for trademark 
holders than the requirement for artistic relevance. Unfortu-
nately, it is still rather lenient towards the game developers. This 
second prong of the test is still difficult for complainants to fulfill 
because, to be explicitly misleading, the unlicensed use must be more 
than merely a representation of the plaintiff’s mark; instead, the de-
fendant’s work must make some sort of affirmative statement of 
the other party’s endorsement accompanying that representation.87 
In spite of their legal difficulties surrounding Battlefield 3, 
Electronic Arts decided not to sign licensing agreements with 
arms manufacturers for trademarked weapons in the sequel 
game in the series, Battlefield 4.88 This could potentially cause the 
                                                                                                                         
83 Id. at *1. 
84 Id. at *3. Textron argued that “[c]onsumers of these games expect that 
the intellectual property of a party is used with the permission and approval 
of the mark’s owner, particularly when a purpose of the game is to realistically 
simulate the use of a product associated with the mark.” Id. at *4. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Dillinger, LLC v. Electronic Arts, No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 WL 
2457678, at *6 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011). 
88 “[T]hey’re asserting their constitutional free speech right to use trade-
marks without permission.” Tom Sykes, EA ditches gun licensing deals this 
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developer to run into issues with the explicitly misleading prong 
of Rogers. Electronic Arts had previously paid the arms makers for 
the rights to virtually reproduce real-world weapons,89 which con-
sumers could view as a mutual endorsement of the products.  
Furthermore, only a few months earlier, Electronic Arts was 
criticized for promoting gun manufacturers.90 As part of market-
ing for the game Medal of Honor: Warfighter, the developer cre-
ated a website detailing all of the game’s featured weapons.91 Not 
only did the website list all of the arms, but it also contained direct 
hyperlinks to the manufacturers’ purchasing catalogs for each of the 
respective weapons.92 The game developer publicly boasted on its 
official website about its partnerships with some of these manu-
facturers.93 Even if Electronic Arts were to argue that consumers 
would not normally assume a brand placement in a video game 
indicates the mark holder’s permission and approval, given Elec-
tronic Art’s recent open sponsorship and licensing agreements for 
trademarked weapons in its previous war video games, a reason-
able consumer might conclude that Electronic Arts has made the 
same marketing links for weaponry in Battlefield 4. The earlier open 
sponsorship between the weapons manufacturers and Electronic 
Arts may be enough to constitute an affirmative statement of en-
dorsement that could be extrapolated to the subsequent game. If 
a challenge arises as to their now-unlicensed virtual representa-
tions of those weapons, Electronic Arts may find it difficult to 
                                                                                                                         
year—but will continue to use branded guns, PC GAMER (May 7, 2013), http:// 
www.pcgamer.com/ea-ditches-gun-licensing-deals-this-year-but-will-continue 
-to-use-branded-guns/ [https://perma.cc/9G34-V7V6]. 
89 Luke Plunkett, EA Won’t Be Paying For Real Guns in Video Games Anymore, 
KOTAKU (May 7, 2013, 11:08 PM), http://kotaku.com/ea-wont-be-paying-for-real 
guns-in-video-games-anymore-494940003 [https://perma.cc/96G2-2XUB]. 
90 Paul Tassi, Cross Promotion Gone Wrong: EA Removes Gun Manufacturer 
Links from Warfighter Site, FORBES (Dec. 27, 2012, 10:01 AM), http://www 
.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2012/12/27/cross-promotion-gone-wrong-ea-removes 
-gun-manufacturer-links-from-warfighter-site/ [https://perma.cc/G38C-3PWA]. 
91 Barry Meier & Andrew Martin, Real and Virtual Firearms Nurture a 





93 Tassi, supra note 90. 
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overcome the Rogers requirement that the work must not be ex-
plicitly misleading as to source or content. 
IV.  A CASE FOR A UNIFIED TEST: VIDEO GAMES PRIMARILY 
SERVE A COMMERCIAL PURPOSE 
Use of both the transformative-use test and the Rogers test to 
decide cases involving the right of publicity and unlicensed trade-
mark use in video games has led to varying and inconsistent hold-
ings among  courts.94 Circuit courts employ the different tests, which 
creates confusion about what the applicable standard should be.95 
A good example of this uncertainty manifests itself in Brown v. 
Electronic Arts, a case not dissimilar to Keller or Hart.96 There, a 
professional football player sued Electronic Arts for the use of his 
likeness in the Madden NFL series of video games.97 Unlike in the 
NCAA video game cases, the court did not apply the transformative-
use test, instead subjecting the claim to the Rogers test.98 The Ninth 
Circuit claimed that the Rogers test was appropriate because 
Brown brought his claims under the Lanham Act.99 Unsurprisingly, 
the court found in favor of the defendant under the exceptionally 
permissive Rogers test, where Brown may have prevailed under 
the transformative-use test applied in Keller and Hart, which in-
volved developers’ use of personal likenesses. 
                                                                                                                         
94 See supra Parts II–III; see, e.g., Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
95 See supra Parts II–III. 
96 See generally Brown, 724 F.3d 1235. 
97 Id. at 1239. 
98 Id. at 1239–41. 
99 Id. at 1239.  
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, 
or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, 
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any 
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of 
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which ... is 
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of 
his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another 
person …. 
Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012). 
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In addition to the unreliable employment of tests among 
courts, even courts using the same test can fluctuate in their ap-
plication of the tests to similar fact patterns.100 Much of the un-
certainty could be resolved if both the right of publicity cases and 
trademark infringement cases were treated consistently under 
the same test. 
Although statutory law and state common law generally gov-
ern the right of publicity, the Lanham Act can provide protection 
of a person’s identity falsely used to advertise a commercial prod-
uct.101 Some criticize the Ninth Circuit’s use of the Rogers test in 
Brown in what could have been a right of publicity case subject to 
transformative-use,102 but the Brown court actually made a large 
step toward creating a unifying test for right of publicity and 
trademark infringement cases in video games. Video games should 
be treated as a commercial product, and developers’ use of a ce-
lebrity’s likeness should be treated as a commercial purpose. That 
way, both types of cases can be afforded federal protection under 
the Lanham Act. This would override the diverse and differing 
statutory and common law doctrines that currently confuse mat-
ters for right of publicity cases in video games.103 Lanham Act 
protection would allow for the application of a single test to right 
of publicity and trademark infringement cases  in video games. 
The problem with simply classifying video games as commer-
cial products, of course, is that they do not solely serve a commer-
cial purpose.104 Video games are also artistic expressions subject 
to First Amendment protection.105 Video game studios color their 
                                                                                                                         
100 See supra Part II. 
101 See Right of Publicity: An Overview, supra note 10; Lanham Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
102 Jonathan Faber, Two New Video Game Rulings from the Ninth Circuit, 
Jim Brown v. EA and Keller v. EA, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (Aug. 9, 2013), http:// 
rightofpublicity.com/tag/lanham-act [https://perma.cc/3C2M-XS5Z]. 
103 See supra Parts II–III; see, e.g., Brown, 724 F.3d at 1235. 
104 Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–91 (2011) (“Like 
the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games com-
municate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary 
devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features 
distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual 
world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection.”). 
105 Id. 
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games using various artistic styles to bring their virtual worlds to 
life; they can include immersive musical scores, tell stories, create 
characters, and convey ideas. A video game is a work of art just 
as is a book, a movie, or a play.106 
On the other hand, the video game industry is incredibly prof-
itable. Since 2010, video game sales in the United States alone 
have brought in an average of just under $16 billion a year.107 
Including the hardware and accessories for the games, consumers 
in the United States spent $22.41 billion in 2014 alone.108 Video 
games draw a wide demographic, including a significant amount 
of consumers from every age group.109 While traditionally people 
may view video games as for young males, this is simply not the 
case.110 The average video game player is 35 years old, and 44 per-
cent of consumers are women.111 Today, four out of every five 
American households own a device on which to play video games.112 
It is clear from these statistics that video games are a very prof-
itable commercial enterprise. 
The fact that companies often contract with video game devel-
opers to include product placement only further strengthens the 
case to consider video games as a commercial product.113 In mod-
ern times, consumers have come to expect product placement in 
                                                                                                                         
106 Id. 
107 See ENTM’T SOFTWARE ASSOC., 2015 SALES, DEMOGRAPHIC AND USAGE 
DATA: ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE COMPUTER AND VIDEO GAME INDUSTRY, at 12 
(2015), http://www.theesa.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ESA-Essential-Facts 
-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR73-8MHU] (between 2010 and 2014, video game 
sales in the United States reached $17.1, $16.7, $15.2, $15.4, $15.4 billion each 
year, respectively). 
108 Id. at 13. 
109 Twenty-six percent of videogame players are under 18 years of age; 30 
percent are 18–35; 17 percent are 36–49; and 27 percent are 50 years or older. 
Id. at 3. 
110 Henry Jenkins, Reality Bytes: Eight Myths About Video Games Debunked, 
PBS, http://www.pbs.org/kcts/videogamerevolution/impact/myths.html [https:// 
perma.cc/96VZ-2P6E]. 
111 ENTM’T SOFTWARE ASSOC., supra note 107, at 3. 
112 Id. at 2. This statistic is likely a conservative understatement consider-
ing the recent rapid technological advancement and boom of smart phones and 
mobile gaming in recent years. 
113 Brand placement in video games is particularly effective because it pro-
vides for active involvement with the brand as well as a platform for longer 
shelf life than other media. See generally Michelle R. Nelson, Recall of Brand 
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much of their visual media.114 Consumers have become so bom-
barded with it in movies and television that when the camera 
zooms in and lingers on the front logo of a Mercedes G-Class SUV 
in Jurassic World, consumers know exactly what is going on.115 
The same is becoming true for video games.116 The cost of creating 
games has risen substantially over the last few years, driven by 
increased consumer expectations and the added complexity of each 
new generation of video game console technology.117 Despite the 
growing cost of production, the consumer price for games has stayed 
relatively constant for about a decade.118 To keep up with the cost 
of creation, game studios are now looking to other streams of rev-
enue to avoid raising the price for consumers, particularly looking 
to product placement.119 As the amount of product placement in 
video games increases, consumers expect it more.120 As gamers 
become accustomed to seeing product placement, they may begin 
                                                                                                                         
Placements in Computer/Video Games, 42 J. OF ADVER. RES., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 
80. This makes it very enticing for companies to contract for product placement 
in games. 
114 Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Rethinking the Parameters of Trademark Use 
in Entertainment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1032 (2009). 
115 Drew Harwell, ‘Jurassic World’ Shows Just How Weird Product Place-
ment has Become, WASH. POST (June 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/12/jurassic-world-shows-just-how-weird-product-place 
ment-has-become/?utm_term=.89be4dc47d9f [https://perma.cc/Q2UB-FUGA]. One 
study showed that consumers have come to expect product placement so much 
that 43 percent of consumers believed that the main purpose of a scene in a 
television show featuring a product was to influence purchase, even if no deal 
had been made between the mark owner and the television producers. James 
Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 882, 919 (2007). 
116 Nelson, supra note 113, at 81. 





sig2=JItk1M57x_QRaUdI_MO-uw&cad=rja [https://perma.cc/7FXJ-8EE7]. Some 
blockbuster video games can cost over sixty million dollars and take years to 
produce. Id. at 16. 
118 Consumers typically pay fifty to sixty dollars for a video game produced 
for a home console. Id. 
119 Len Glickman & Anita Kim, Product Placement and Technology, 30 ENT. 
& SPORTS LAW., Spring 2012, at 32. 
120 Rosenblatt, supra note 114, at 1056–57. 
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to believe any use of a familiar trademark or celebrity image is 
the result of a marketing deal.121 
The perception of video games as a commercial product and a 
platform for product placement should place them under the pro-
tection of the Lanham Act in right of publicity cases. Of course, courts 
could extend this same argument to other media, particularly tele-
vision or movies, but this Note does not delve into the precise charac-
ter of those media and the body of case law relating to them. Since 
video games exist in a twilight area between an artistic work and 
a commercial product, it is important that whichever test is applied 
balances the rights of artistic expression with the prevention of com-
mercial exploitation: something that neither the transformative-
use test nor the Rogers test in its current form has been able to do. 
V. A REFORMED ROGERS TEST: TRANSFORMATIVE-USE AS A 
FACTOR FOR THE EXPLICITLY MISLEADING PRONG 
The right of publicity in these cases serves to protect the same 
interests as trademark law through the Lanham Act.122 In a way, 
a celebrity’s name and likeness is his or her own personal trade-
mark.123 Similarly, both categories must also balance those rights 
with the First Amendment right of others who seek to use the 
marks and likenesses.124 Since both laws contend to protect and 
balance the same rights, it should follow that both laws be subject 
to the same test in claims of unauthorized use. 
Although many criticize the Ninth Circuit’s use of the Rogers 
test in Brown,125 that decision is important in establishing that 
                                                                                                                         
121 Id. If consumers believe that a particular kind of trademark use must 
always be authorized by the mark holder, then consumers will infer that any 
such use implies sponsorship or approval by the mark holder and an unautho-
rized use becomes, by definition, an infringement. Id. at 1020. 
122 Both the right of publicity and trademark law exist to protect against 
consumer confusion but also to protect the right holder’s cultivated reputation 
and goodwill from others who seek to impermissibly take advantage of it or 
tarnished it. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
123 “In cases involving confusion over endorsement by a celebrity plaintiff, 
‘mark’ means the celebrity’s persona.” White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 
F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992) (arising in a case involving a television adver-
tisement promoting a Samsung video-cassette recorder and the unconsented 
use of game show host Vanna White’s likeness). 
124 See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text. 
125 Faber, supra note 102.  
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the Rogers test can be used in cases involving celebrity likenesses 
in video games. It presents an example of how cases centered on 
rights of publicity in video games could be offered federal protec-
tion under the Lanham Act.126 If courts accept that the primary 
purpose of video games is a commercial one, then they can conclude 
that any recreation of a celebrity likeness or name is therefore 
commercial in nature.127 Consumers could perceive the appear-
ance of the likeness as a celebrity’s endorsement of the game.128 
This would do away with the dual treatment and ensuing confu-
sion between unlicensed trademark use cases and right of public-
ity cases to create a single test under which both types of cases 
could be resolved. 
Unfortunately, the great deference that the Rogers test, in its 
current form, gives to video game developers does not do much to 
protect those whose trademarks and likenesses are used without 
permission.129 If the primary purpose of trademark law is to pro-
tect against consumer confusion,130 then the Rogers test does not 
sufficiently reach that aim given popular beliefs about product 
placement.131 An easy way to remedy this without completely 
overturning all prior decisions would be to continue using the 
Rogers test but to fortify its explicitly misleading prong. 
                                                                                                                         
126 It is actually quite strange that the majority of the right of publicity cases 
discussed above do not invoke the Lanham Act and the Rogers test considering 
that Rogers v. Grimaldi itself centered around exactly that type of claim. See 
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1989). 
127 In Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., the Ninth Circuit explains how a celebrity’s 
likeness used in advertisement may constitute a false endorsement of the ad-
vertised product: 
A false endorsement claim based on the unauthorized use of a 
celebrity’s identity is a type of false association claim, for it al-
leges the misuse of a trademark, i.e., a symbol or device such 
as a visual likeness, vocal imitation, or other uniquely distin-
guishing characteristic, which is likely to confuse consumers as 
to the plaintiff’s sponsorship or approval of the product. 
978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992) (arising from a case involving a recreated 
imitation of famous American singer-song writer Tom Waits’s voice in an ad-
vertising campaign). 
128 Id. 
129 See supra Part III. 
130 Stewart & Lehman, supra note 9, at 4. 
131 See supra notes 109–16. 
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The artistic relevance prong of Rogers is lenient, but rightly so. 
“Non-zero”132 relevance is extremely permissive, but the standard 
allows courts to make a very simple threshold determination about 
whether a mark adds any artistic value to the work. Any further 
assessment of artistic relevance is far too subjective, so increasing 
the standard to anything more than “non-zero” would present a 
significant problem in practical applications. Courts likely would 
have differing opinions on where to draw the line regarding what 
actually makes something artistically valuable and how to distin-
guish what meets that elevated threshold. A simple non-zero stan-
dard, in practice, allows for more consistency in applying the Rogers 
test. It keeps what would otherwise become a very gray, opinion-
based decision, a binary, black-and-white determination: either a 
use has any amount of artistic relevance, or it has none at all. 
The explicitly misleading prong, in contrast to the artistic rel-
evance prong, provides room to guard against flagrant unlicensed 
mark and likeness use while still protecting the First Amendment 
artistic expression rights of video game developers.133 To practi-
cally do this, courts must adopt several more factors in determining 
whether the use actually misleads as to the source of its content. 
Until now, courts have also applied this prong, like artistic rele-
vance, very leniently.134 Absent an affirmative statement or action 
from the game developer, a court will not find an unlicensed use 
of a mark or likeness to be explicitly misleading.135 It seems this 
                                                                                                                         
132 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d. 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[U]nless [it] ... has 
no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever ....”) (emphasis added). 
133 See supra notes 82–92 and accompanying text. Some of the cases against 
Electronic Art’s Battlefield series begin to show how the explicitly misleading 
prong may be used to protect mark holder rights. While Textron was settled 
out of court before a final verdict, that court was at least sympathetic that the use 
of the Bell Helicopter in that game is “sufficient to establish plausible disputes 
as to the existence of actual consumer confusion.” Elec. Arts, Inc. v. Textron 
Inc., No. C 12-00118 WHA, 2012 WL 3042668, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012). 
134 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
135 “To be ‘explicitly misleading,’ the defendant’s work must make some af-
firmative statement of the plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement, beyond the 
mere use of plaintiff’s name or other characteristic.” Dillinger, LLC v. Electronic 
Arts, No. 1:09-cv-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 WL 2457678, at *6 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 
2011). For example, the use of “the phrase in a subtitle of ‘an authorized biog-
raphy’ would be sufficiently explicit to be actionable, if false”; but, evidence 
that the trademark use “might implicitly suggest that the named celebrity had 
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standard is primarily focused on whether an unlicensed mark user 
intends to explicitly mislead consumers. Perhaps this was an ade-
quate standard for use of a mark when Rogers was first decided. 
Today, however, given the shift in contemporary expectations for 
product placement and endorsement in modern media discussed in 
Part IV,136 the presence or absence of an affirmative statement 
alone does not do enough to protect against video game developers 
explicitly misleading consumers. The standard should not be based 
on an unlicensed user’s intent to mislead consumers, but the stan-
dard should aim to determine whether the user actually misled them. 
Courts could use several factors in making this determination. 
While the factors of the original “likelihood of confusion”137 test 
developed in Polaroid do not fit nicely in the context of video 
games, they can be looked to for inspiration. A primary consider-
ation under the Polaroid test is the risk of actual consumer con-
fusion.138 As stated above, whether the use of an unlicensed mark 
or likeness actually misleads consumers should be the primary 
goal of the revised standard. The old Polaroid test also took into 
account the sophistication of consumers.139 In the modern ap-
proach, this consideration can acknowledge video gamers’ expec-
tations of product placement and celebrity endorsement. 
One of the new factors for the explicitly misleading prong 
could be transformative use.140 A sufficiently transformed mark 
                                                                                                                         
endorsed the work or had a role in producing it” is “outweighed by the danger 
of restricting artistic expression.” Id. (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999–1000).  
136 See supra Part IV. 
137 These factors include: (1) the strength of the prior owner’s mark; (2) the 
degree of similarity between the marks; (3) the commercial proximity of the 
products; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap by entering 
and competing in the subsequent owner’s market; (5) the risk of actual con-
sumer confusion; (6) the intent of the defendant to capitalize on the reputation 
of the prior owner; (7) the quality of the defendant’s product, and the sophisti-
cation of consumers. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 
(2d Cir. 1961). All of these factors do not perfectly align with the concerns for 
video game cases, but some of them are still relevant. See id. 
138 See id. 
139 Id. 
140 Transformative use closely resembles “the degree of similarity between 
marks” factor from the likelihood of confusion test. Id. Transformative use has 
been used to address video game cases already and carries behind it the weight 
of the case law discussed in Part II. 
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or likeness is unlikely to trigger a consumer’s expectation of prod-
uct placement or endorsement.141 A transformed mark actually 
satisfies both prongs of the Rogers test. In including a trans-
formed mark, the game developer intends it to serve as a contex-
tual tool to either establish an authentic and immersive virtual 
reality or as a parody of the unaltered mark.142 Either way, the test’s 
artistic relevance standard is very likely met. The transformed 
image should be enough to alert consumers that the true mark 
holder did not seek to endorse the video game or cross-promote 
through it, thus satisfying the Rogers explicitly misleading prong.143 
It follows that any finding of a sufficient transformation would 
then be dispositive in showing that the same use passes the Rogers 
test. The absence of a sufficient transformation, however, would 
not necessarily invalidate an unlicensed use if the game developer 
could show that it did not explicitly mislead consumers based on 
other factors. 
Courts should also consider whether the developer made an 
affirmative statement of sponsorship as a factor in determining if 
a use satisfies the explicitly misleading prong.144 Under the new 
Rogers test, an affirmative statement of sponsorship coupled with 
lack of permission from the mark holder would certainly fail this 
prong.145 The absence of an affirmative statement, on the other 
hand, would not shut down the plaintiff’s claim.146 Furthermore, 
courts should interpret what constitutes an affirmative statement 
of sponsorship as more than a simple written or oral declaration. 
The determination should be made based on the totality of the 
                                                                                                                         
141 See Rosenblatt, supra note 114, at 1057. 
142 See id. 
143 A transformed use ensures against risk of actual consumer confusion—
a quintessential determination in the likelihood of confusion test. Polaroid 
Corp., 287 F.2d at 493. 
144 Currently, courts consider this as the only way of determining whether 
a game developer using an unlicensed mark is explicitly misleading to consumers. 
See supra note 135 and accompanying text. Under the new test, this would be 
one of multiple considerations.  
145 There is no dispute here because this action would almost always indicate 
the video game developers’ intent to deceive consumers or at the very least, ex-
treme negligence in doing so.  
146 This is consistent with the likelihood of confusion test’s analysis of the 
intent of the defendant to capitalize on the reputation of the prior owner. See 
Polaroid Corp., 287 F.2d at 495. 
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circumstances. Courts must look at all of the game developer’s 
actions that expose consumers to the unlicensed use.147 
As a further factor, courts might also look at the game devel-
oper’s purpose for using the mark or likeness in determining if that 
use is explicitly misleading. In a way, this speaks somewhat to 
artistic relevance, but courts should instead focus on how consum-
ers will interpret the presence of the mark or likeness. Consider-
ations for the factor should include whether the use is necessary 
in establishing the context of the video game,148 whether it makes 
a symbolic or artistic point,149 or whether it simply seeks to capi-
talize on the popularity of the trademark or celebrity.150 
Finally, courts should look at the frequency with which the 
mark or likeness appears in the video game and its importance 
taken in the context of the game as a whole.151 Infrequent and 
unimportant uses should not trigger the explicitly misleading 
prong of the Rogers test. This would still allow for incidental use 
of marks in video games.152 Developers could continue to include 
well-known trademarks to create an immersive world without 
much risk of the average video game player believing that each 
small use of a mark represented that mark holder’s involvement 
in the creation or promotion of that game. 
Utilizing these new factors—transformative use, affirmative 
statement of sponsorship, purpose of use, and frequency and im-
portance of use—as part of the Rogers test’s explicitly misleading 
prong, courts can look back at the cases discussed above to achieve 
more uniformity in the application of a rule. Claims brought under 
right of publicity and trademark would all be subject to federal 
protection under the Lanham Act, allowing for the application of 
the reformed Rogers test in every case. Brown would have been 
                                                                                                                         
147 Under this view, Electronic Arts’s actions regarding Battlefield 4 and 
Medal of Honor, as discussed in Part III, would certainly amount to an affirma-
tive statement of sponsorship. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 
148 Rosenblatt, supra note 114, at 1057. 
149 Id. 
150 See Polaroid Corp., 287 F.2d at 495. 
151 This speaks to the likelihood of confusion test’s factor of commercial prox-
imity of the products. See supra Part I. A frequently appearing or importantly 
placed mark or likeness in a video game runs a greater risk of consumers as-
suming the two are cross-promoting. 
152 See Wintermyer, supra note 1, at 1244. 
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correct in applying Rogers, but the court would have come to the 
opposite conclusion.153 While there was no affirmative statement 
of sponsorship in that case, Brown’s likeness was not substan-
tially transformed; the purpose of using his image in the game 
was to capitalize on his fame and reputation as a football athlete 
to attract consumers to purchase the game. His appearance was 
also important as a playable character on the 1965 Cleveland 
Browns in-game. These factors tend to show that consumers would 
be misled by the appearance of Brown’s likeness in the game. The 
other football cases involving NCAA players, Keller and Hart,154 
would undergo similar analyses under these new Rogers factors 
and also come out in favor of the football players, just as they did 
under the transformative-use test. Rockstar would also have come 
out the same as it did, allowing for the use of the “Pig Pen” virtual 
reconstruction of the “Play Pen” strip club.155 However, it would 
have been subject to a slightly higher level of scrutiny but ulti-
mately would have been a valid use because the substantial trans-
formation of the parody gentlemen’s club would protect against 
consumer confusion. 
CONCLUSION 
Both the right of publicity and trademark law strive to prevent 
consumer confusion by protecting a right holder’s image and rep-
utation against others who seek to take advantage of it. These 
rights often come to odds with the First Amendment right of free-
dom of expression for those who seek to reproduce the holder’s mark 
in their work. Video games present a relatively new form of media 
in which these rights must be balanced. Their status as both an 
artistic medium and a commercial product has confused courts on 
which of the two tests—the transformative-use test or the Rogers 
test—properly applies to trademark claims under the Lanham 
Act and which applies to right of publicity claims. To further ob-
scure the matter, courts have inconsistently applied the two tests, 
resulting in varying outcomes for similar claims. Courts could 
streamline the matter by devising a single test to apply to both 
types of cases. Because video games are significantly commercial 
                                                                                                                         
153 See Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239–41 (9th Cir. 2013). 
154 See supra notes 55–65 and accompanying text. 
155 See supra notes 69–76 and accompanying text. 
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in nature and because consumers have come to expect product 
placement and celebrity endorsement in games, plaintiffs can 
bring right of publicity claims under the federal protection of the 
Lanham Act. This would allow for the application of the Rogers 
test in all suits over an unauthorized use of a mark or likeness. 
Unfortunately, the Rogers test in its current form is not well- 
suited to protect the interests of the mark holder; it is far too le-
nient to video game developers, allowing for unlicensed mark use. 
In order to better balance the rights of mark holders with the ar-
tistic expression right of game developers, courts should examine 
several factors when determining if an unauthorized use should 
be afforded First Amendment protection. These factors will reveal 
whether the video game creators are explicitly misleading con-
sumers as to the source of a mark; the factors include: whether 
the mark has been substantially transformed, whether the devel-
oper has made an affirmative statement of sponsorship regarding 
the mark, the purpose of using the mark, and the frequency and 
importance of the mark in the context of the video game. 
  
